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Abstract—Histogram-based watermarking schemes are in-
variant against pixel permutations and can be combined with
permutation-based ciphers. However, typical histogram-based
watermarking schemes based on comparison of histogram
bins are prone to de-synchronization attacks, where the whole
histogram is shifted by a certain amount. In this paper we
investigate the possibility of avoiding this kind of attacks by
synchronizing the embedding and detection processes, using the
mean of the histogram as a calibration point. The resulting wa-
termarking scheme is resistant to three common types of shifts
of the histogram, while the advantages of previous histogram-
based schemes, especially commutativity of watermarking and
permutation-based encryption, are preserved.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that histogram-based watermarking
schemes are resistant to permutations of image pixels. In
particular, this implies robustness against rotation, scaling
and translation (RST) of images. Recently, this fact has been
utilized to devise a commutative watermarking-encryption
(CWE) scheme by choosing a permutation cipher for encryp-
tion and a histogram-based scheme for watermarking [1].
However, typical histogram-based watermarking schemes
like [1], [2] work by comparing selected histogram bins,
where the selection process is controlled by a watermarking
key. If the whole histogram is shifted by a small amount, i.e.
by adding a small number to each pixel’s value, the detector
will use different bin pairs for extracting the embedded
watermark and will produce wrong results. To overcome
this problem, in the present paper, we extend the scheme
described in [1] by deploying a synchronization process
between embedder and detector that is based on the global
mean of the histogram. A similar approach is used in the
scheme [3], but this watermarking scheme does not use a
sufﬁciently long secret watermarking key and has a limited
capacity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II we brieﬂy summarize previous histogram-based water-
marking algorithms. Section III describes the three types
of histogram shifts we have investigated, and Section IV
describes the proposed algorithm in greater detail. In Section
V we discuss experimental results for the algorithm, and
Section VI concludes the paper and gives directions for
further work.
II. RELATED WORK
The most widely studied approach to histogram-based wa-
termarking is so-called exact histogram speciﬁcation [4]–[6],
where the histogram of the original image or a (randomly
and secretly selected) sub-region of it is modiﬁed toward
a target histogram, which is then used as the signature for
watermark detection. However, exact histogram speciﬁcation
does not involve a secret embedding/detection key, and there
are few other histogram-based watermarking algorithms
which do.
The scheme proposed by Xiang et al. in [3] (based on
earlier work on audio watermarking [7]) represents the his-
togram shape as the ratios of population between groups of
two neighbouring bins and then modiﬁes the ratios to carry a
key-based pseudo-random sequence. Only histogram bins in
the range [(1−λ)A¯, (1+λ)A¯] are used in the process, where
A¯ is the global mean of the histogram and λ ∈ [0.5, 0.7] is a
public parameter. In order to withstand scaling and cropping
attacks on the image that will also affect the histogram and
the mean, the extraction process uses a search process based
on the mean A¯′ of the histogram of the marked image:
Different ranges [(1 − λ)(A¯′ + s), (1 + λ)(A¯′ + s)], where
s is an integer running through some search space, are
tried, until the correlation between the extracted sequence
and the known embedded sequence reaches the maximum.
The resulting scheme is very robust against geometric image
modiﬁcations and lossy compression, but it suffers from two
severe limitations: The parameter λ may be seen as a water-
marking key if kept secret, but there are only 26 possibilities
for λ. Also, the effective capacity of the scheme is only 20-
30 bits. While the synchronization process deployed in [3]
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is very similar to the process described here, the present
approach has a much larger keyspace and capacity.
The following two histogram-based watermarking
schemes do use a longer watermarking key, but are by
construction prone to histogram shifting attacks: The
scheme proposed by Chrysochos et al. [2] is based on the
idea of (selectively) swapping two selected histogram bins
a and b, where the distance between a and b is a ﬁxed
number d < 10. A message bit is encoded by the relative
heights of the two bins (denoted by hist(a) and hist(b)):
a 1-bit is encoded by hist(a) > hist(b) and a 0-bit by
hist(a) < hist(b). Here, swapping two histogram bins a and
b means changing all pixel values a to b and vice versa.
In [1], the scheme described in [2] is extended
and integrated into a CWE (Commutative Watermarking-
Encryption) scheme. Histogram bins a and b are randomly
selected from the 256 available bins under the condition
that their relative distance is smaller than 10. This leads to
a signiﬁcant enlargement of the key space. As this scheme
also forms the basis for the present watermarking algorithm
it is described in greater detail in Section IV.
III. HISTOGRAM SHIFT ATTACKS
In this section we describe simple histogram modiﬁcation
attacks, where the histogram as a whole is shifted on the
horizontal axis by adding a ﬁxed amount to each pixel’s
greyvalue. We differentiate among three ways of histogram
shifting:
A. Cyclic Histogram Shifting
In a cyclic shift, the greyvalue of each pixel P (i, j) is
shifted by a certain amount x modulo 256:
Pattacked(i, j) = (P (i, j) + x) mod 256,
where x is a positive or negative integer. Due to the wrap-up
at the end of the histogram, cyclic histogram shifting may
lead to severe degradation of image quality. Cyclic histogram
shifts therefore constitute less relevant attacks. Moreover,
cyclic shifts are invertible if the amount of shift is known.
B. Accumulated Non-Cyclic Histogram Shifting
Here, the wrap-up in cyclic shifting is avoided as the
shift is only applied to those pixels whose greyvalues are
sufﬁciently small or big. For example, a rightward shift can
be deﬁned by
Pattacked(i, j) =
⎧⎨⎩P (i, j) + x, if P (i, j) < 256− x,P (i, j), else.
where x is a positive integer. This kind of histogram modi-
ﬁcation leads to an accumulation of pixels at the start or the
end of the histogram. Nevertheless, the amount of image
distortion remains small, if |x| is sufﬁciently small. Note
that this kind of histogram shift cannot be reverted, unless
sufﬁcient information about the original histogram is known.
C. Histogram Cropping
Histogram cropping is performed directly on the his-
togram bins H(i), 0 ≤ i ≤ 255. The bins are shifted to
the left (or right), where bins H(i) with i < 0 (or i > 255)
are dropped. A rightward shift-and-crop operation can be
deﬁned as
Hattacked(i) =
⎧⎨⎩0, if 0 ≤ i ≤ x− 1,H(i− x), if x ≤ i ≤ 255.
The resulting histogram for small |x| is similar to the original
one, but contains less pixels and therefore does not constitute
a valid histogram. However, after rescaling the attacked
histogram, the attacked image can be constructed from the
attacked histogram by exact histogram speciﬁcation [4].
D. Comparing the Shifts
Depending on the shape of the histogram, the three kinds
of shift behave very similarly up to a certain amount of shift.
Figure 1 shows the effects of the various kinds of shift on
the same example histogram (the blue channel histogram of
the baboon image, see Figure 3(a)).
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Figure 1. Effects of a histogram shift by the amount of 10 (a) Original
histogram; (b) Cyclically shifted histogram; (c) Non-cyclically shifted
histogram; (d) Shifted and cropped histogram
This is also veriﬁed when measuring the amount of
distortion caused by the histogram shifts by calculating the
PSNR between the original image and the image with shifted
histograms, as Figure 2 shows.
The apparent similarity of the different kinds of shift
motivates the idea of reversing the effects of non-cyclic shifts
and histogram crops on the watermarked image by a cyclic
histogram shift which has a similar effect on the image at
the detector side. The optimal cyclic shift amount is found
when the linear correlation of the detected mark and the
reference mark reaches the maximum (see Section IV-B).
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Figure 2. The amount of distortion caused by histogram shifts (a) Blue
channel of baboon image; (b) Blue Channel of Lenna image
IV. THE PROPOSED WATERMARKING ALGORITHM
The design goal of the presented algorithm is to improve
the robustness of previous histogram-oriented algorithms
against simple histogram shifts, while retaining the origi-
nal advantages, especially commutativity of watermarking
and permutation-based encryption. Moreover, the algorithm
should be able to use a watermarking key that is long enough
to withstand brute-force attacks.
A. Embedding
The basic process for embedding is the same as described
in [1]: Given an N -bit watermark W = {wi}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , a
single watermark bit wi is embedded by pseudo-randomly
selecting two histogram bins that have not been selected be-
fore, if their distance is smaller than some strength parameter
d < 10 and if they are not of equal height. The heights of
the two selected bin pairs ai and bi encode wi as follows:
if wi = 1, hist(ai) < hist(bi) should hold, and if wi = −1,
hist(ai) > hist(bi) should hold, where hist(x) denotes the
height of the bin x. If this is not the case, the two bins ai
and bi are swapped. The selection process is governed by
a watermark key WK . The theoretical maximum capacity
that can be achieved by this scheme is 128 bits and can
be further extended by using more than one color channel
and/or subdividing the image.
In order to speed up the search for the optimal amount
of cyclic shift during extraction, we devised a calibration
process that uses the global mean value A¯ of the image as
a calibration point. More speciﬁcally, before selecting the
histogram bins for embedding, all bins are cyclically shifted
by an amount of x = 256− A¯ as described in Section III-A
so that the bin corresponding to A¯ becomes the ﬁrst bin in
the calibrated histogram. After calibrating, the embedding
process proceeeds as described above.
B. Detection
Basically, the detector works by comparing the histogram
bins as speciﬁed by the watermarking key. For this to work,
the embedder and the detector need to be synchronized, i.e.
they need to use the same ordering of histogram bins. As
a histogram shift will change the global mean greyvalue
of the marked image, the detector searches for the correct
calibration point by cyclically shifting the histogram of the
marked image by x = 256− A¯′ − s, where A¯′ is the mean
value of the marked image, and s runs through the search
space S = {s| − A¯′/4 ≤ s ≤ A¯′/4}. The detector then
computes the linear correlation of the extracted mark Wex =
{w˜i} with the reference mark W = {wi} for each s. The
detector response is
max
−A¯′/4≤s≤A¯′/4
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
w˜iwi
)
.
The watermark is detected if the detector response exceeds
a certain threshold T .
C. Keyspace and False Positive Probability
As the calibration process prior to selecting the histogram
bin pairs does not affect the number of available bin pairs,
the size of the key space K(N), where N is the length of
the watermark, stays the same as in the scheme [1]:
K(N) > N ! ·
(
256
N
·min
(
9,
256
N
− 1
))N
.
Now let W˜ be a mark extracted from an unmarked image IU .
If W˜ agrees with W at k positions, their linear correlation
is 2k−NN . Therefore, the mark is wrongly detected if k >
N
2 (T + 1). In order to simplify the analysis, we assume
that the bipolar bits of W˜ are evenly distributed in the set
{−1, 1}. Then, the probability that two single bits of W and
W˜ agree is 1/2. Therefore, the false positive probability for
a single detection step becomes
q =
(
1
2
)N
·
N∑
k=N2 (T+1)
(
N
k
)
.
For N = 64, the bound T = 0.7 yields q ≤ 2.98 × 10−18.
If the detection process is carried out by running through
a search space of size |S|, the false positive probability
becomes
p(False Positive) = 1− (1− q)|S| ≈ q|S| for small q
D. Commutativity with Permutation Based Encryption
As the presented algorithm is completely histogram-based
and the histogram is invariant to permutations, the commu-
tativity property
M(Ek(I),m) = Ek(M(I,m))
holds, where E is the encryption function, k is the encryption
key, I is the plaintext media data and m is the mark to be
embedded.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The main difference between the present algorithm and
the algorithm proposed in [1] consists in the calibration step
performed before embedding and detecting, which has no
impact on the amount of distortion. Therefore, results on
visual distortion carry over from [1].
In order to evaluate the robustness of the algorithm, we
embedded 64 random bits into the blue channel of all 24
images from the Kodak image database (see http://r0k.us/
graphics/kodak) and three standard images from the SIPI
image database (see http://sipi.usc.edu/database/). Figure 3
shows the visual effect of embedding for the three standard
images.
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Figure 3. Embedding 64 random bits into test images (a) Marked baboon
image (PSNR: 50.55 dB); (b) Marked sailboat image (PSNR: 58.86 dB);
(c) Marked Lenna image (PSNR: 58.60 dB).
As it turned out, the three standard images show a rather
prototypical behaviour with respect to robustness against the
three kinds of histogram shift attacks. Figures 4(a) and 4(b)
show a very good robustness for the sailboat and Lenna
image, due to the fact that the corresponding histograms
behave very similarly for the three kinds of shift and the
shifts may thus be reversed by a suitable cyclic shift quite
accurately. The relevant histogram for Figures 4(c) and 4(d)
is the blue channel histogram of the baboon image (see
Figure 1(a)), which behaves less favorably. In this case, the
results can be signiﬁcantly improved by enlarging the search
space, e.g. to S = {s| − A¯′/2 ≤ s ≤ A¯′/2}, as Figure 4(d)
shows. All other tested images behaved in a similar way.
Thus, a robust detection strategy consists in enlarging the
search space successively if the mark is not detected at ﬁrst.
The resulting increase of the false positive probability is
negligible (see section IV-C).
VI. CONCLUSION
It is hard to devise a robust watermarking algorithm that
can work in the encrypted domain, because there are no
visually important features to use for embedding in this
case. In the present paper, we have extended an earlier
algorithm that is commutative with encryption by deploying
a synchronization process between the embedder and the
detector, making it robust against simple histogram shifts.
Our further work will focus on improving robustness against
other common image modiﬁcations such as lossy compres-
sion.
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Figure 4. Robustness results against histogram shifts (a) Sailboat image
(b) Lenna image; (c) Baboon image; (d) Baboon image with an enlarged
search space.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Schmitz, S. Li, C. Grecos, and X. Zhang, “A new approach
to commutative watermarking-encryption,” in Proc. Commu-
nications and Multimedia Security: 13th IFIP TC 6/TC 11
International Conf., CMS 2012. Springer, 2012, pp. 117–130.
[2] E. Chrysochos, V. Fotopoulos, A. N. Skodras, and M. Xenos,
“Reversible image watermarking based on histogram modiﬁca-
tion,” in Proc. 11th Panhellenic Conf. Informatics (PCI 2007),
2007, pp. 93–104.
[3] S. Xiang, H. J. Kim, and J. Huang, “Invariant image wa-
termarking based on statistical features in the low-frequency
domain,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video
Technology, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 777–790, 2008.
[4] D. Coltuc and P. Bolon, “Robust watermarking by histogram
speciﬁcation,” in Proc. 1999 Int. Conf. Image Processing
(ICIP’99), vol. 2. IEEE, 1999, pp. 236–239.
[5] S. Roy and E.-C. Chang, “Watermarking color histograms,” in
Proc. 2004 Int. Conf. Image Processing (ICIP 2004). IEEE,
2004, pp. 2191–2194.
[6] C.-H. Lin, D.-Y. Chan, H. Su, and W.-S. Hsieh, “Histogram-
oriented watermarking algorithm: colour image watermarking
scheme robust against geometric attacks and signal process-
ing,” IEE Proc. Vision, Image and Signal Processing, vol. 153,
no. 4, pp. 483–492, 2006.
[7] S. Xiang and J. Huang, “Histogram-based audio watermarking
against time-scale modiﬁcation and cropping attacks,” IEEE
Transactions on Multimedia, vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 1357–1372,
2007.
